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Cogency is the central normative concept of informal logic. But it is a 
loose evaluative concept and I argue that a generic notion covering all 
of the qualities of a well-reasoned argument is the most plausible con-
ception. It is best captured by the standard RSA criterion: in a good 
argument acceptable (A) and relevant (R) premises provide suffi cient (S) 
grounds for the conclusion. Logical qualities in a broad sense are af-
fected by the epistemic qualities of the premises and “consequence” in 
a broad sense exhibits an interplay of form and content. There are four 
proposals for the premise—conclusion relation: (i) no strictly logical con-
nection (“non-logical” consequence); (ii) one type of connection only (de-
ductivism); (iii) a few types of connection (deduction, induction, perhaps 
conduction and analogical reasoning); (iv) many types of connection (ar-
gumentation schemes). Deductivism is a serious option but in its strong 
version, as the discussion about petitio shows, it fails to establish that 
arguments which are not cogent are thereby invalid. And weak deductiv-
ism, very attractive from the pedagogical point of view, has some defi -
ciencies (implausible hidden premises; preservation of truth, not proba-
bility). I argue that the idea of a counterexample, when we regard certain 
components of the argument as fi xed and others as variable, is the best 
approach to the analysis of the illative core of every-day arguments (the 
approach of David Hitchcock on material consequence).
Keywords: Informal logic, consequence, begging the question, 
cogency, deductivism, counterexample.
1.
W. V. O. Quine (1950: vii) opens his Methods of Logic with a famous 
quote: “Logic is an old subject, and since 1879 it has been a great one.”1 
The year marks the appearance of Frege’s Begriffsschrift and the im-
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pressive development of modern logic ever since. But there is Logic 
(the old subject) and there is the logical dimension of (everyday) argu-
mentation and reasoning. Often about hot political issues. Thus in his 
notorious Diary Frege (1924) writes about patriotism:
The question here is not about a judgment in the sense of logic, not about 
considering something as true, but about one’s feelings and inner attitude. 
Only Feeling [Gemüt] participates, not Reason, and it speaks freely, with-
out having spoken to Reason beforehand for counsel. And yet, at times, it 
appears that such a participation of Feeling is needed to be able to make 
sound, rational judgments in political masters. (Mendelsohn 1996: 33)
The following comment is perhaps too harsh: “The man who wanted to 
set mathematics on surer logical foundations, was content for politics 
to be based on emotional spasms.” (Monk 2017). Still, these are sur-
prising claims for the founder of modern logic which make one won-
der how do formal logical theories and the logic of every-day reasoning 
mesh together. The latter is nowadays the subject of the so-called “in-
formal” logic, characterized rather broadly as a “collection of norma-
tive approaches to the study of reasoning in ordinary language that 
remain closer to the practice of argumentation than formal logic” (van 
Eemeren 2009: 117). Originally the opposition to formal logic was more 
clearly stated: 
… that branch of logic whose task it is to develop non-formal [i.e., not re-
stricted to logical form] standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, 
interpretation, evaluation, critique and construction of argumentation in 
everyday language. (Blair 2014: 373–374. 
One of the pioneers of the informal logic later adds (Blair 2015: 27): “I 
would today drop ‘standards,’ and say “arguments and argumentation” 
and “natural language””. I agree with the ecumenical spirit of the re-
mark—classical deductive standards are no longer excluded by fi at (the 
original defi nition was: “Informal logic designates that branch of logic 
whose task is to develop non-formal standards, criteria, procedures for 
the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, critique and construction of 
argumentation in everyday language” (Johnson and Blair 1977: 148). 
But the working assumption still seems to be that the analysis of argu-
ments and argumentation in natural language has little to do with the 
areas of formal logic where Frege made his great contributions.
There is another issue where Frege’s approach was described as hav-
ing “deleterious effects both in logic and philosophy” (Dummett 1973: 
432–433). According to Frege in logic truth is not merely the goal, but 
also the object of study. Traditionally, however, the relation of logical 
consequence (“transitions from sentences to sentences”) is the proper 
subject-matter of logic. “Informal” logicians speak about the premise-
conclusion relationship as the “illative” core of argumentation, “This, 
therefore that,” a single integrated set of one or more propositions ad-
duced as grounding or evidence in support of a claim. An illative move 
or a series of illative moves is made “… from the basis or starting point 
of the reasoning or argument to the upshot that is inferred or alleged to 
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follow from that basis. Some call this move an inference, others call it 
an implication, others call it a premise-conclusion link, and others call 
it a consequence relation” (Blair 2012: 103).
How to characterize this “illative” core of argumentation from the 
“informal” or broad point of view?
2.
In contrast to classical soundness, requiring valid arguments with true 
premises, cogency emerged as the central normative notion in the ap-
proaches that remain closer to the practice of argumentation. Unfortu-
nately the notion is not well defi ned and the usage is not uniform. Some 
use it broadly to cover the qualities of a successful argument, others 
use it narrowly as a characterization of good reasoning (strictly illative 
moves). Moreover, there are subdivisions within each camp, narrow us-
age encompasses either inductive strength (corresponding to deductive 
validity) or both deductive and non-deductive patterns of reasoning. In 
the other camp some will reserve the label for something like inductive 
soundness (corresponding to classical soundness), while others speak 
of all of the qualities of a successful argument (deductive or non-deduc-
tive). Consider the scheme:
COGENCY Narrow Broad
Reasoning Inductive strength Inductive and deductiveUmbrella validity (Govier)
Argument Inductive “soundness” Good
The narrowest option (inductive strength corresponding to classical 
validity) is exemplifi ed, for instance, by Feldman (2014: 95): “an argu-
ment is cogent if and only if it is not valid but the premises of the argu-
ment are good reasons for the conclusion,” or “an argument is cogent if 
and only if it is not valid but the conclusion is probably true if all the 
premises are true.” Broader, but still limited to non-deductive argu-
ments are typical uses in contemporary critical thinking literature, for 
instance: “a cogent argument is an inductive argument that is strong 
and has all true premises” (Hurley 2015: 52 and Baronett 2015: 43). 
Cogency is “inductive soundness” so to speak. But the textbook usage 
is not uniform at all, sometimes an idiosyncratic terminology is used: 
“An argument is reliable when it is inductively strong and has all true 
premises” (Johnson 2016: 10). Or Vorobej (2006: 54): “An argument is 
reliable just in case both (a) it is not valid and (b) its conclusion is more 
likely to be true than false, given that each of its premises is true.” The 
classic Copi textbooks do not defi ne the notion at all, though they do 
speak about arguments being fairly cogent or moderately cogent (Copi 
1990: 538), qualifi cations which make sense for inductive strength only.
Cogency as an illative evaluation of the reasoning in a broad sense 
is supposed to cover both arguments which are deductively valid and 
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those which are inductively strong. According to Cozzo (2017): “A co-
gent inference is an inference that “compels us to accept the conclusion” 
if we accept the premises.” Govier (2018: 288) introduced the notion of 
umbrella validity: “An argument is (umbrella) valid if its premises are 
properly connected to its conclusion and provide adequate reasons for 
it.” Plumer (2016: 92) stipulates that cogency should be used instead: 
“I take it to pertain only to an argument’s reasoning or logic, not also 
to the truth value of its propositional elements (unlike the technical 
concept of soundness) … I take cogency to be the broader notion of 
proper reasoning as compared to the technical concept of validity.” But 
then, somewhat surprisingly, he adds (Plumer 2016: 92): “Depending 
on how the constituent notions are explicated, we can agree with John-
son & Blair’s (1977) well-known and widely accepted “RSA” criteria 
for argument cogency: the premises are to be relevant, suffi cient, and 
acceptable.”
The relevance of premises and their suffi ciency pertain to the ad-
equacy of the (broad) inferential link: the reasons offered must be pro-
batively relevant to the conclusion and they have to be suffi cient for ac-
cepting it. The relevance “criterion” is best understood as a criterion of 
inclusion of premises in the analysis and reconstruction of arguments. 
Only probatively relevant propositions may be counted as premises 
(Blair 2012: 93). One might say that relevance establishes the infer-
ential connection and suffi ciency guarantees its strength, so you can 
have relevance without suffi ciency (weak connections—typical hasty 
generalizations). But the converse is not possible, if the premises are 
not relevant, they cannot be suffi cient either (cf. Biro and Siegel 1992). 
Although there is still some discussion about whether to require truth 
or acceptability as a condition of premise adequacy (Johnson 2000: 
195–199), I agree with the mainstream which favours acceptability 
over truth. Real life arguing often takes place in contexts character-
ized by uncertainty (hypothetical and uncertain beliefs, deep disagree-
ments about what is true and false, ethical and aesthetic claims) where 
the truth is too stringent (or inappropriate). Also, there had better be 
a sense in which false conclusions can sometimes be reasonably well 
supported—the whole discussion about pessimistic induction in phi-
losophy of science (the cases of generally accepted but false theories in 
the past which are supposed to subvert our expectations about our best 
present-day theories) would otherwise be pointless. Acceptability is an 
epistemic notion, roughly, premises are acceptable when it is reason-
able for those to whom the argument is addressed to believe them (they 
are justifi ed in believing them).
A negative designation of cogency based on the RSA criteria is now 
also an option—to be cogent the argument must avoid three basic fal-
lacies: irrelevant reason, hasty conclusion and problematic premise (cf. 
Freeman 2011: xi). The criterion now amounts to the broad notion of 
soundness and we thus get cogency in the broadest possible sense. Here 
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are some variations. According to Adler (2006: 225): “‘Cogency’ is used 
broadly to refer both to correct support relations, validity, in the case 
of deductive arguments, and to the soundness, warrant, and relevance 
of the premises.” But he then adds: “I use ‘cogency’ as a generic term to 
cover the qualities of a successful argument.” I suppose this is the dom-
inant view in the theory (if not in the practice exemplifi ed by the text-
books) of informal logic, witness Govier (2018: 287–88): “If the premises 
of an argument are rationally acceptable and are ordered so as to pro-
vide rational support for the conclusion, the argument is cogent.” Or 
Blair (2012: 46), “A logically ‘cogent’ argument has acceptable premises 
as well as an acceptable premise-conclusion link” and Hitchcock (2017: 
4): “I take an argument to be cogent for somebody when and only when 
(1) that person has justifications which are independent of the conclu-
sion for accepting its premises and (2) the conclusion follows from the 
premises.” This is also close to typical philosophical usage, thus Wright 
(2002: 331): ”cogent argument is one whereby someone could be moved 
to rational conviction of-or the rational overcoming of doubt about-the 
truth of its conclusion.”
The last option, cogency as a generic term covering all of the quali-
ties of a good, well-reasoned argument seems to me to be the best choice. 
Narrow (inductive) reasoning is just too restrictive. Why should a sim-
ple modus ponens, for instance, when considering whether to water the 
garden, my wife says: “It’s going to rain. If it is going to rain, there is 
no need to water the garden,” not be a cogent everyday argument? A 
deduction which never the less moves me to the rational overcoming of 
doubt about the truth of its (omitted) conclusion. The same consider-
ations will exclude inductive soundness as too narrow. And cogency as 
broad reasoning implies that valid arguments are always cogent, but 
the notorious question-begging arguments are valid, yet they lack the 
qualities of being good and cogent arguments, as we shall later see. 
Still, we should acknowledge the fact that cogency is a loose evalu-
ative concept and its meaning, as the examples above show, is to some 
degree stipulative (Plumer 2016: 92). But I think that the oscillation 
between good reasoning (strictly illative moves only) and good argu-
ment, one which deserves to convince us of its conclusion, marks one 
of the central turning points of informal logic with respect to classical 
formal logic. Will an argument fail to be cogent if you have no reason 
to believe one or more of its premises? Can you have a well-reasoned 
argument with unacceptable premises? Can evidential considerations 
affect the quality of reasoning in the broad sense? The majority of in-
formal logicians would say yes. They frequently view the determination 
of the acceptability of premises as an important part of the logical ap-
praisal of arguments. Whether the relevant premises warrant a conclu-
sion depends on what else is known about the matter under consider-
ation. Plumer (2006: 93) quotes Salmon that nondeductive reasoning 
is cogent if “the argument has a correct form, and … the premises of 
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the argument embody all available relevant evidence.” And according 
to Pinto (2001: 27): “assessment of inferential link cannot be carried 
on in isolation from assessment of premise acceptability.” I agree, just 
consider some typical instances of absent evidence reasoning (or argu-
ments from ignorance):
I checked the train table: the connection between Ljubljana and Venice is 
not listed. No records, so no train connections? Marco Polo’s travel journals 
are silent on the Great Wall of China. No evidence, so no visit? If evolution 
happened, where have all the intermediate forms gone? No fossil records, 
so no evolution? The fact that no one has been able to pick up a tailpipe 
from a UFO does not mean UFOs do not exist. Absence of evidence is not 
evidence of absence? A wave of recovered memories about alien abductions 
is likely the product of fabrication or suggestive therapeutic techniques, be-
cause we have never found any material traces of these alien abductions. No 
evidence, so no abductions? There is no reliable evidence available to us of 
the number of stars being even. So it must be odd.
Some of these pieces of reasoning are cogent, some are fallacious, but 
they display a typical interplay of form and content, logical qualities in 
a broad sense are affected by epistemic qualities of premises.
3.
I began with the normative issue—the logical evaluation of the “il-
lative” core, but so far I said nothing about the nature of this core. 
Predictably, there is no consent, the informal community is working 
with the following proposals for the premise—conclusion relation: (i) 
no strictly logical connection (“non-logical” consequence); (ii) one type 
of connection only (deductivism); (iii) a few types of connection (de-
duction, induction, perhaps conduction and analogical reasoning); (iv) 
many types of connection (argumentation schemes).
As for the fi rst option, one could start with classical deniers, say 
Quine (1986, vii) and his dismissal of the application of the word ‘log-
ic’ as covering both, deductive and inductive logic: “The philosophy 
of inductive logic, however, would be in no way distinguishable from 
philosophy’s main stem, the theory of knowledge”. Informal logic as a 
separate approach was more visible for Hintikka (1999: 115): “I have a 
great deal of sympathy with the intentions of those philosophers who 
speak of ‘informal logic’, but I don’t think that any clarity is gained by 
using the term ‘logic’ for what they are doing.” One can still fi nd claims 
that “Nonformal logic is the science of arguments not strictly governed 
by consequence” (Hanna 2006: 30) and even informal logicians them-
selves, in the spirit of rejecting formal logic as the tool to be used for 
the analysis of natural language argumentation, sometimes character-
ize illative moves as “non-logical” consequence (Hitchcock 2009). These 
claims are based on a certain narrow conception of logical form and 
logical consequence—what is distinctively logical about arguments is 
associated to their formal aspects, where individual arguments are val-
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id only in virtue of instantiating truth-preserving logical forms investi-
gated by formal deductive logic. But why exclude the clearly logical di-
mension of everyday argumentation from the domain of logic in a broad 
sense? To be fair, Hitchcock has done a lot to clarify the general notion 
of “follows from” but he later calls it, more aptly, material consequence.
On the other extreme one fi nds a growing collection of argumen-
tation schemes—“forms of argument (structures of inference) that 
represent structures of common types of arguments used in everyday 
discourse, as well as in special contexts like those of legal argumen-
tation and scientifi c argumentation” (Walton 1996: 1). Examples are 
means-end reasoning, inference to the best explanation, inductive gen-
eralization from instances, reasoning from the results of a randomized 
trial to a causal conclusion, lack-of-knowledge arguments, and so forth. 
Walton initially discussed 25 schemes, but Walton, Reed and Macagno 
(2008) later identify 96 distinct argumentation schemes. A lot of impor-
tant work has been done within this approach, but the infl ation of pre-
sumptively good patterns schemes (like the infl ation of “bad” patterns 
within the fallacy approach to informal logic) has not really helped to 
clarify the nature of the “following from” relation. Especially since we 
can, apparently, multiply schemes indefi nitely. Do all of these patterns 
share a common logical core or not?
Two options remain: deductivism and the approach, nowadays dom-
inant, which recognizes various degrees or kinds of the premise-conclu-
sion connection. Govier (1992: 393) calls the last approach the pluralist 
view of cogency, though it is clear that pluralism encompasses a very 
limited number of relations: deductive entailment, conducive support, 
inductive support and analogy.
Deductivism is the view that ordinary arguments are best analysed 
as deductive inferences, but this does not mean that the analysis and 
appraisal of arguments is based upon classical logical form and this or 
that formal system. All defenders of deductivism agree that an infer-
ence is deductively valid if and only if it is impossible for its premises 
to be true and its conclusion false. But they add that not every aspect 
of good reasoning boils down exclusively to classical soundness. Accord-
ing to the weak version deductive validity should not be equated with 
formal validity: material validity will do just as well. Given the premis-
es: “Ann is taller than Bill and Bill is taller than Mary” it is impossible 
that it should be false that “Ann is taller than Mary.” This impossibility 
is explained in terms of the meanings of non-logical terms (“being taller 
than”) not in terms of standard logical constants. According to strong 
deductivism, however, a principal factor in distinguishing good from 
bad reasoning is inferential deductive validity where an inference is 
deductively valid if and only if it is logically impossible for its premises 
to be true and its conclusion false.
Jacquette (2007 and 2009) defends strong deductivism, all and only 
good reasoning is, minimally, deductively valid inference:
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According to deductivism, formal logic is therefore the continuation of infor-
mal logic by more rigorous symbolic mathematical methods, while informal 
logic is the continuation of formal logic by non-symbolic nonmathematical 
means (2009: 189). /…./ There is but one logic, then, whose gold standard is 
deductive validity, with purely formal and purely informal logical methods 
appearing at the extremes of a spectrum of ways of understanding the de-
ductive validity status of inference (2009: 192).
But he immediately faces the problem that valid arguments with true 
premises are always sound, but not always cogent. There are seem to 
be instances of fallacious reasoning which are deductively valid and 
Jacquette readily accepts the challenge: “A single deductively valid in-
formal fallacy is suffi cient as a fatal counterexample to deductivism” 
(2009: 190). He never the less tries to defend deductivism by treating 
all recognized informal fallacies as deductively invalid. A discovery of a 
single deductively valid informal fallacy or of a cogent but deductively 
invalid reasoning would present a counterexample to strong deduc-
tivism. I will critically discuss the fi rst option only. And one fallacy 
only—I think that circular reasoning or petitio principii is a touchstone 
for strong deductivism.
Jacquette attempts to reconstruct begging the question as a deduc-
tively invalid piece of reasoning. The full content of circular reasoning 
for him is not: “P, therefore P” but rather “P, therefore it is signifi cant 
(worthwhile, informative) to conclude that P” (Jacquette 2009: 203–
204). According to this expanded reconstruction it is logically possible 
for the assumption to be true and the conclusion false—uninformative 
and insiginifi cant (Jacquette 2009: 204): “the thinker falsely supposes 
that it is signifi cant, worthwhile or informative to conclude that a cer-
tain proposition is true from an assumption base that includes the very 
same true or false proposition.” Jacquette acknowledges the fact that 
it may be an informal matter to judge the relevance of the conclusions 
in question.
According to this diagnosis it is always possible that in circular 
arguments the premises are true but it is still false that it is signifi -
cant, worthwhile or informative that the conclusion is true. Of course, 
every traditional fallacy of relevance will automatically fi t this bill of 
invalidity (appeal to force, ad hominem, straw man, missing the point, 
red herring ...)! This looks like a very cheap victory for deductivism 
and almost trivial. Defenders of deductivism can be more informative. 
Weak deductivism claims that “natural language arguments should be 
understood as attempts to formulate deductive arguments” (Groarke 
1999: 2). This claim is perfectly compatible with the RSA criterion of co-
gency. The difference between cogent and fallacious arguments is then 
to be found in the truth or plausibility of their premises. Petitio, though 
valid, is not cogent because the premises are not acceptable (for the 
audience in doubt of the conclusion).
Jacquette has to offer a different diagnosis: petitio is not valid be-
cause the conclusion is not inferred signifi cantly. Now, being “signifi -
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cant” is on a different level than being “true” (or acceptable), what we 
have is a normative assessment of reasoning and as we remember from 
Carroll and his Tortoise (1895), it is never a good policy to mix the levels. 
First of all the explicit form cannot be just “P, therefore it is signifi cant to 
conclude that P.” It might be the case that for a certain type of audience 
it is signifi cant to conclude that P and resolve a certain issue, perhaps to 
justify P by some other reasons. The intended reading must then be: “P, 
therefore it is signifi cant to conclude that P from P.” In order to assess 
the validity of this reasoning we now need a criterion of signifi cance. The 
conclusion (“It is signifi cant to conclude that …”) will then be false either 
because it violates certain dialectical (rhetorical) norms or because it vio-
lates norms of cogency. In any case deductive invalidity is not doing any 
work at all—one could just as well drop the initial P from “P, therefore it 
is signifi cant to conclude that P from P,” and explain why it is not signifi -
cant (informative, etc.) to conclude that P from P! But the explanation 
will not appeal to the notion of deductive validity.
Moreover, strong deductivism is in danger of falling into the old 
trap of proclaiming all deductively valid arguments as question-beg-
ging. All that Jacquette (2009: 204) has to say about this old conun-
drum is: “The same lack of signifi cance need not plague logically more 
complex deductively valid inferences, such as modus ponendo ponens 
or tollendo tollens, reductio ad absurdum, or the like, if these infer-
ences are considered as issuing in worthwhile or informative conclu-
sions.” Well, what is the difference? To infer, say, “P & Q, therefore P” 
is presumably not signifi cant. But “P & Q” is logically equivalent to “Q 
& (Q => P)”, so why should modus ponens “Q, Q => P, therefore P” be 
any better in terms of signifi cance? The selection of premises obviously 
plays an important role. But why so?
Jackson (1987) makes an interesting proposal. By propounding an 
argument I offer to my audience not only premises as evidence for the 
conclusion but, in an implicit way, also reasons (evidence) for the ac-
ceptability of those premises. To take his example:
A Mary is at the party. If Mary is at the party, Fred is too. So, Fred 
is at the party.
The hearer is entitled to infer that I have separate evidence for each of 
the premises. Perhaps I have just seen Mary at the party, and I also 
know that Mary and Fred always go to parties together. The way of 
presenting my argument and the selection of premises provide impor-
tant information about the evidence available for possible “borrowing.” 
The hearer knows enough about the kind of evidence likely to lie be-
hind my assertions (perception, familiarity with the couple) to borrow 
it to good purpose. Now take:
B Mary and Fred are at the party. So, Fred is at the party.
In general, to infer “P & Q, therefore P” is not signifi cant, or, as 
Jackson would say only “marks time.” But this need not be true for “Q, 
Q => P, therefore P” (the form of our fi rst argument). The difference 
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will be explained in terms of the kind of (implicit) reasons I have for the 
acceptability of my premises and the hearer of the argument then bor-
rows. If she doubts the conclusion in the second case (B) she will very 
likely have background beliefs relative to which the reasons indicated 
by propounding the argument (seeing them both at the party) will have 
no impact. This is precisely Jackson’s defi nition of begging the question 
(1987, 35): “an argument such that any (sane) audience which was in 
doubt about the conclusion would have background beliefs relative to 
which the evidence provided by propounding the argument has no im-
pact.” Note: reasons (evidence) for accepting the premise are decisive 
for the question whether the argument is fallacious or not. Evidential 
considerations affect the quality of reasoning in the broad sense.
4.
Jackson emphasizes a dialectical and pragmatic dimension of pro-
pounding an argument—the persuasive power of the argument depends 
on the impact of the evidence implicitly offered for borrowing on the 
particular audience. This might lead to a different diagnosis of petitio 
and perhaps another escape route for deductivism. Circular reasoning 
“is not fallacious in the true sense of the word, but objectionable and to 
be avoided in argumentation for another reason” (Jacquette 2009: 203). 
Petitio principii is generally lacking in argumentative signifi cance, but 
this alone does not make it fallacious, this form of reasoning remains 
valid. This strategy is in line with contemporary rhetorical and prag-
ma-dialectical approaches to argumentation. Thus Perelman (Perel-
man and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971: 112): “the petitio principii, which does 
not concern the truth but the adherence of the interlocutors to the pre-
supposed premises, is not an error of logic, but of rhetoric / … / an error 
in argumentation.”
Crudely put—an argument is a set of statements or propositions or 
natural-language declarative sentences one of which is the conclusion, 
the remainder of which are the premises. Argumentation is the activity 
of arguing, a complex, social speech act in which either only one speak-
er presents a thesis to an audience and defends it or more speakers do 
so “dialectically.” According to epistemic theories the principal goal of 
argumentation is, roughly, to induce belief or elicit a reasoned change 
in view (Harman 1986). Perelman defends a different, rhetorical theory 
of argumentation—the goal of argumentation is to cause or increase 
the addressee’s belief in the conclusion. And consensus theories of argu-
mentation see argumentation as a means for reaching consensus, or, in 
a more elaborate way (Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 1):
Argumentation is a verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing 
a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a 
constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed 
in the standpoint.
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Circular arguments, in general, are fallacious because they violate 
normative rules of dialogue which demand consensual starting points. 
Fallacies are bad arguments in the sense of being Gricean failures of 
co-operation which violate rules of critical discussion. There are eight 
such rules and the sixth rule (the starting point rule) states (Eemeren 
and Grootendorst 2004: 193): 
Discussants may not falsely present something as an accepted starting 
point or falsely deny that something is an accepted starting point.
By falsely presenting something as a common starting point, the pro-
tagonist tries to evade the burden of proof. The techniques used for this 
purpose include advancing argumentation that amounts to the same 
thing as the standpoint. Consider The Bank Manager Example, “a sta-
ple of many textbooks”: 
Manager: Can you give me a credit reference?
Smith: My friend Jones will vouch for me.
Manager: How do we know he can be trusted?
Smith: Oh, I assure you he can.
In this dialogue one person is supposed to vouch for the reliability of 
the other. The reliability of the vouchee is in doubt and some secure 
source is needed to reassure this doubt. But if the reliability of the 
voucher is questioned, the reliability of the vouchee cannot be used to 
reassure this doubt, because it is itself in doubt, in the fi rst place (cf. 
Walton 1991: 248). One could as well say that Smith falsely presents 
his reliability as an accepted starting point in a dialogue. But now con-
sider the famous Moore’s argument for the existence of an external 
world (Jackson 1987: 35):
 M1: This is a hand.
M2: A hand is an external object.
Therefore: At least one external object exists.
According to the pragma-dialectical approach dogmatist (Moore) false-
ly presents his hands as an accepted starting point (as an object in the 
external world) in his dialogue with the skeptic. 
I cannot discuss all of the nuances of this approach, let us just ask 
ourselves, why is the fi rst premise a false move in the Moore’s case? 
And what differentiates petitio from other unacceptable starting points 
(say inconsistent, irrelevant or doubtful premises)? The discussant who 
in the discussion fulfi ls the role of protagonist of a standpoint will in 
the argumentation stage at a certain moment express a proposition 
that he claims can be identifi ed as a common starting point by means 
of the “intersubjective identifi cation procedure.” But how will this pro-
cedure look like? When the premise is not equivalent to the conclu-
sion it is not at all easy to identify common starting points. I think 
that the falsity will be revealed through reasoning in the broad sense. 
To continue in line with Jackson—what matters is not just the prem-
ises themselves, but the reasons offered for their acceptability: M1 is 
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supported by perceptual experience. The sceptic, doubtful about the 
conclusion, will point out that it is seriously possible that there are 
no external objects, since we are, say, envatted and handless brain-in-
a-vats, having non-veridical sensory experiences. This background will 
block the perceptual reasons for M1 and thus make this premise inef-
fective. In any case the diagnosis of the falsity is epistemic: the premise 
in the examined case of arguing is epistemologically unsuitable for the 
purpose of proving (justifying) the conclusion in that particular discus-
sion. And, therefore, we may add, an unacceptable starting point.
Pragma-dialectical approach is perhaps inspired by Aristotle—in 
the Topics he is concerned with contentious disputation between two or 
more parties. Begging the question is said to occur where a questioner, 
the party who is supposed to be arguing for a certain thesis, asks to be 
granted the thesis as a premise to be conceded by his opponent. Aris-
totle uses the same terminology in the Prior Analytics (64b 33), where 
he says it is the attempt to prove what is not self-evident by means of 
itself. But demonstration proceeds from what is more certain or better 
known: if a man tries to prove what is not self-evident by means of it-
self, he begs the original question (64b 37). To beg the question is to vio-
late the epistemic principle of the priority in knowledge of the premises 
over the conclusion in a demonstration. This second account is epis-
temic, the fi rst dialectical or conversational. Sosa (2004: 57) suggests to 
use “vicious circularity” in the fi rst case and reserve “begging the ques-
tion” for something involving not so much proper reasoning as proper 
dialogue. But it is clear that Jacquette and pragma-dialecticians aspire 
for a uniform explanation of all of the cases in terms of violating certain 
pragmatic rules. Unsuccessfully, as I have tried to show.
There are various other ways of how to disqualify question-begging 
arguments as not cogent. According to Woods (2004: 34) “p, so p” is 
always a fallacious inference but there is nothing wrong with the en-
tailment “p entails p.” Plumer (2016: 92) declares such arguments as 
cogent and fallacious (well- and poorly reasoned) at the same time in 
different respects. But if question-begging arguments are not cogent 
because the inferential link is defective then cogency incorporates epis-
temic considerations. In the simplistic formulations above some prem-
ise of the argument is equivalent to the conclusion. I believe that the 
dependency conception, illustrated by Moore’s proof, is more general 
(cf. Walton 2006). Normally the “fl ow of inference” in an argument is 
from the premise to the conclusion. But where it is also required that 
an inference be made in the other direction, from the conclusion to the 
premise, the argument begs the question. In every argument the con-
clusion depends, justifi catorily, on the premise, but when the “fl ow of 
justifi cation” goes in both directions, the argument begs the question. 
Blockades are also part of the “fallacious” inferential game: doubts 
about the conclusion might prevent the premise of having any inferen-
tial power. In any case petitio violates the normative requirements of 
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good reasoning in a broad sense, it is “fallacious in the true sense of the 
word,” not just pragmatically inappropriate.
5.
If strong deductivism is true, then reconstructions of the informal falla-
cies (violations of the RSA criteria) as deductive invalidities are possible 
in every case. I argued that petitio remains “a fatal counterexample to 
deductivism.” Weak deductivism, however, remains a viable option for 
the premise—conclusion relation. Remember: deductive validity is not 
defi ned by “formal validity” as canonized in a certain formal system. 
An argument is deductively valid if (and only if) it is impossible for the 
premises to be true and the conclusion false, and material validity will 
do as well. Deductivism within informal logic also “recognizes that the 
domain of premise/conclusion relations is only one ingredient of good 
argument, and that it is an ingredient which needs to be situated in a 
more comprehensive account of argument which includes an account 
of differences of opinion, standpoints, implicit and indirect argument 
components, and so on” (Groarke 1999: 5). Pragma-dialecticans actu-
ally embrace deductivism in the form of indirect speech acts expressing 
hidden premises which make arguments valid.
How to situate weak deductivism with respect to cogency? We might 
say with Govier (1992: 393) that an argument is cogent if and only if 
(1) its premises (explicit and implicit) are acceptable to the audience to 
whom the argument is addressed; (2) its explicit premises, when prop-
erly supplemented by implicit premises, deductively entail its conclu-
sion. When the premises of an argument deductively entail its conclu-
sion, that argument satisfi es the relevance and suffi ciency conditions 
according to Govier (2010: 90). This is slightly imprecise—I agree with 
Hitchcock that a deductive argument still establishes its conclusion if 
it contains an irrelevant premise; it is simply inelegant because of this 
superfl uity (Hitchcock 2017: 361). Still, let us assume that deductive 
arguments are unobjectionable from the ‘R’ and ‘S’ point of view. But, 
as we saw, cogency includes acceptability and for Govier (2018: 430) 
at least, question-begging arguments “will be adequate from the point 
of view of deductive logic, and yet be inferentially fl awed because the 
audience cannot rationally move from acceptance of the premises to ac-
ceptance of the conclusion.”
Weak deductivism is a very simple theory—the inference relation 
is an all-or-nothing thing. For the opponent, to use a metaphor sug-
gested by Groarke (2009: 102), the inference relation is like glue which 
comes in different strengths: “Sometimes premises and conclusion are 
glued so tightly together, the bond is almost unbreakable; sometimes 
the bond is extremely weak and tenuous; sometimes, somewhere in-be-
tween.” I think that the strongest case for deductivism comes from ped-
agogical practice. There is only one type of reasoning and instructions 
for the reconstruction of natural language arguments are very simple: 
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look for additional premises that explicitly link the original premises 
to the conclusion in such a way that the reconstructed argument comes 
out as valid. The whole burden of evaluation is then on the accept-
ability of the premises. This comes as a relief for anybody engaged in 
teaching informal logic and critical thinking where one often wonders 
what kind of techniques, exactly, to teach and how to test the results.
Attractive as it is deductivism also has some well-known defi cien-
cies. Many arguments appear to offer reasonable, but not deductively 
conclusive justifi cation for their conclusions, yet the hidden premises 
needed to make them valid are just too strong and so unacceptable. 
Consider the very mundane case discussed by Groarke (2009: 97): “The 
weather network said it was going to rain tomorrow. Therefore, it is 
going to rain tomorrow.” On the face of it, this is as good as it gets, 
reasonable enough to accept, but, of course, fallible. But Groarke, in 
order to make it deductively valid, includes a hidden premise: “The 
weather network is never wrong.” And he adds: “This is not, of course, 
a sound argument. The hidden premise is just silly.” But why adding 
a silly premise? He speculates that the person who argues has a naïve 
confi dence in the accuracy of the weather network’s forecasts. Well, 
she might, but it is much more plausible to start with the everyday as-
sumption that the arguer is using ordinary inductive type of reasoning. 
Groarke (2009: 98) considers this option in the form: “The weather net-
work said it was going to rain tomorrow. Therefore, it is probably going 
to rain tomorrow.” We are now supposed to add a hidden premise: “The 
weather network is usually accurate.” And he thinks that a rational 
agent cannot believe in the fi rst two premises without believing in the 
conclusion, so, given the premises, it must be the case that it will prob-
ably rain tomorrow. The main tenet of deductivism—that the truth of 
the conclusion of a good argument follows necessarily from the truth of 
the premises—is thus compatible with probabilistic reasoning.
I agree with Godden (2005: 173) that deductive standards preserve 
truth but not plausibility, probability, or likelihood. The lottery par-
adox is quite convincing: consider a fair 1000-ticket lottery that has 
exactly one winning ticket. For each individual ticket it is highly prob-
able (99.9%) that it will not win, but we cannot deduce that it is highly 
probable that no ticket will win. A rational agent can believe in the 
whole lot of a thousand premises without believing in the deductively 
inferred conclusion.
Probability is a complicated issue, however, and a relation between 
deduction and induction is a huge issue (Jacquette (2009: 201, fn. 5) 
quotes a slogan attributed to Sellars: “An inference is either deductive 
or defective.”) Still, I fi nd it diffi cult to accept that the only good argu-
ments are those for which absolutely no counterexample is to be found. 
Govier (1992: 403) offers a more plausible variety of grounding rela-
tions: premises ensure/entail/make it probable/support/give evidence 
… that the conclusion is true. Or, better still, in terms of counterex-
amples (Godden 2005: 171), accepting the premises of the argument, 
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we should accept its conclusion if (i) the only counterexamples to be 
found are highly improbable; (ii) the only counterexamples to be found 
are less probable than the premises; (iii) no counterexample has been 
found yet (it has not been falsifi ed); (iv) no counterexample is already 
to be found amongst our beliefs (coherence). In all of these cases it is 
logically possible for the conclusion to be false given the truth of the 
premises, but this alone does not automatically disqualify the inferen-
tial links in the arguments. Pluralism with relatively “high electoral 
threshold” so to speak (deduction, induction, perhaps conduction and 
analogical reasoning) seems to be the best option for the “following 
from” relation.
6.
Johnson and Blair (2002: 352) remarked that formal logic began with 
Frege as a revolution at the level of theory that later fi ltered down 
into logic textbooks. In informal logic developments at the theoretical 
level were largely motivated by the attempt to teach students how to 
assess arguments in use. We saw that deductivism offers an attractive 
toolkit. But there is another option. Suppose we take the bottom-up 
approach as our starting point for the general understanding of the 
“follows from” relation. One of the main logical skills (to be developed 
by “critical thinking courses”) has always been the technique of coun-
terexamples: the conclusion does not follow, it is possible to accept all 
of the premises but deny the conclusion. But one should consider plau-
sible counterexamples only, not just any logical possibility. Weak de-
ductivism already embraces arguments which are materially valid (it 
is logically possible for premises to be true and the conclusion false, but 
given the meanings of non-logical terms this is not possible). Why not 
continue in this spirit and impose further limitations on the range of 
possibilities to be considered?
Consider, as an example, some contemporary ecological hot issues 
in Slovenia. In a predominantly rural area with a high unemployment 
rate an international corporation proposed to build a car lacquering 
factory on mainly agricultural premises. Predictably a lively contro-
versy ensued, the government and the defenders of the proposal argued 
in the following way:
There is large unemployment and there are no other economic activities in 
this area, so we should not oppose the foreign corporation in their decision 
to build a car lacquering factory on these agricultural premises.
Is it possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false? We 
are interested in serious, contextually relevant possibilities and the 
best way to focus on them would be to extract the “broad” logical form, 
something like:
In the area A we need Y. Z is a source of Y. In the area A there are, cur-
rently, no other sources of Y. The benefi ts of Z outweigh the downsides. 
Therefore we should approve of Z.
448 D. Šuster, On a Consequence in a Broad Sense
We treat some of the repeated content expressions as variables and 
the rest of the argument as logical framework to be kept fi xed when we 
engage in looking for potential counterexamples. Z (car lacquering fac-
tory) is really a source of Y (prosperity) in the area, but it is not the only 
possible source of prosperity and even if benefi ts outweigh the down-
sides it might still be sensible to deny the conclusion (just consider 
chemotherapy and cancer). Now consider a different argument based 
on the same pattern of reasoning. In a windy Karst area, rarely popu-
lated but otherwise a well-known bird resort, the government proposed 
to build wind farms. Again a lively controversy ensued:
In the area A we need Y. Z is a source of Y. In the area A there are, cur-
rently, no other sources of Y. The benefi ts of Z outweigh the downsides. 
Therefore we should approve of Z.
The discussion was mostly about the acceptability of premises (oppo-
nents operate with a rather vague notion of downsides, including “deg-
radation of the landscape” etc.) and it is again possible to accept the 
premises but deny the conclusion even if benefi ts outweigh the down-
sides. Here, it seems, given the “overall” damage done to the environ-
ment by other potential sources of electricity, this possibility is less rel-
evant than in the fi rst case.2 Perhaps a purely deductive reconstruction 
is also possible—weak deductivism is an attractive option. One could 
add premises about the degradation of the landscape and the protec-
tion of birds on one side and new employments, less need for other, 
more problematic sources of energy on the other side and so on. But the 
list is not fi xed, and it seems more plausible to incorporate the content 
of hidden premises as guidelines for potential counterexamples.
Aristotle already typically proves the invalidity of a given syllogistic 
mood by providing an argument displaying the given form but which 
is obviously invalid (with true premises and false conclusion). Cogency 
can be tested in the same way, by matching the structure of a given ar-
gument with that of an argument whose cogency is known or obvious. 
This tactic is called “refutation by logical analogy” and it is based on 
duplicating the core of an argument in another argument by varying 
certain inessential components (marked by variables) while preserving 
the essential ones. If the parallel argument is not cogent, the original 
argument is not cogent either. In classical logic the essential/inessen-
tial partition of vocabulary is given in advance, logical constants are es-
sential, descriptive terms are variable. And, secondly, when inspecting 
the space of possibilities opened by the variable interpretations of non-
logical constants, we have to consider every possibility. Not so when 
we search for counterexamples to cogency: a limited (relevant) set of 
interpretations has to be considered for ‘A’, ‘Y’ and ‘Z’. According to 
Quine’s formulation descriptive terms occur vacuously in logically val-
2 So says the informal logician in the year of 2018. Interestingly enough, the 
car lacquering plant was actually built and windmills were not. As we all know, 
decisions are not always based on logic, even logic broadly understood.
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id arguments and essentially in extra-logically valid arguments. But 
when considering cogency and testing for broad logical consequence in 
“natural” arguments some descriptive terms are contextually vacuous 
(replaced by variables A, Y, Z in our example) and others are fi xed 
(‘area’, ‘source’, ‘benefi ts,’ …).
I think that this approach best captures the interplay of form and 
content, the mix of purely inferential and epistemological, so typical for 
“informal” evaluations. Adler rightly observes (1997: 335):
The proper notion of structure or form is much broader than the notion of 
logical structure or form. Whenever we distinguish in an inference pattern 
between constant elements and variables, open to substitution, where the 
inference turns on the pattern of these constant elements, and not the sub-
stitutions for the variables, we are specifying a structure or form (Brandom 
1988). Additionally, the pattern must yield a rich set of inferences. On this 
conception, criticizing some arguments for the falsity of a premise, when it 
expresses a rich, structural pattern, does constitute the fi nding of a defect 
in form.
Traditionally this broad notion of structure was associated with the 
shift from the form to the matter. Thus understood the form versus 
matter distinction relies crucially on a partition of the vocabulary: 
some of the terms of an argument are thought to pertain to its form, 
while others are thought to pertain to its matter. Logical constants re-
main fi xed while substantial ‘material’ terms are replaced by schematic 
letters (“All A are B and all B are C, so all A are C”) and the ruling out 
of true premises and a false conclusion is due to the meaning of logical 
terms. According to the material consequence the conclusion follows 
because of the meaning of non-logical terms. Bolzano speaks about the 
deductive consequence in the broad sense but I prefer to speak about 
the consequence in the broad sense (cf. Šuster 2012).
I think that the best contemporary development of this broader 
sense of form or broad consequence can be found in the work of David 
Hitchcock (2017). He fi rst spoke about “enthymematic validity,” then 
wrote about “non-logical consequence” and fi nally settled for “material 
validity” and “material consequence” in line with the established tradi-
tion. Material consequence is the relation that results when some but 
not all of the non-logical terms are treated as if they were logical. Ac-
cording to his defi nition (Hitchcock 2017: 124):
A conclusion is a consequence of given premises if and only if the argument 
is an instance of an argument scheme, which may or may not be purely for-
mal, that has no actual or counterfactual instances with true premises and 
an untrue conclusion, even though it has an instance with true premises 
and an instance with an untrue conclusion. 
He later explains the inference-claim of an argument as the claim that 
it has a contentful covering generalization that is non-trivially true. A 
conclusion follows from stated premises in accordance with a counter-
factual-supporting covering generalization of the argument’s “associated 
conditional”: the material conditional whose antecedent is the conjunc-
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tion of the reasons and whose consequent is the claim. Freeman (2011: 
176–179) nicely summarizes this approach in terms of a recipe. Consider:
 Socrates is human. Therefore Socrates is mortal.
First identify the repeated content expressions in the argument and 
uniformly replace repeated content expressions with variables of the 
appropriate category (human, mortal):
 x is human, therefore x is mortal.
The variable components are the ones such that “intracategorial” re-
placement of them results in an analogue which is a potential counter-
example to the original argument. Now form the associated generalized 
conditional, the covering generalization (the conjunction of the premises 
of the argument as the antecedent and the conclusion as the consequent):
 For every x: If x is human, then x is mortal.
To claim that the conclusion of an argument follows from the premises 
is, according to Hitchcock, to claim that the covering generalization is 
necessarily true for some sense of necessity.
The recipe might work for some simple arguments, but I think that 
ecological issues mentioned above already escape the purely “algorith-
mic” approach. Hitchcock rightly points out that in assessing whether 
any argument’s conclusion follows from its premis(es), we regard cer-
tain components as fi xed and others as variable. But in general we can 
only provide guidelines for determining which of the components are 
fi xed and which are variable. Also, I can hardly agree with the total 
dismissal of deductivism: “The doctrine of implicit premises is largely a 
myth. Theorists of argumentation and practitioners of argument anal-
ysis and evaluation should abandon it” (Hitchcock 2002: 160). Some ar-
guments should really be analysed as enthymemes, deductive patterns 
with missing premises. A principled division between material con-
sequence and deductive consequence proper is still an open question 
(though Freeman 2011: 173–195, makes some interesting proposals).
In any case Hitchcock has developed a promising approach to under-
standing the “follows from” relation, and I cannot do justice to all of the 
details of his rich analysis. I think that broad logical consequence, based 
on the traditional idea of counterexamples and the interplay of form and 
content best captures the central idea of normative assessment in the 
area of everyday arguments, something like (Fisher 2012: 25): “Could 
the premises be true and the conclusion false judging by appropriate 
standards of evidence or appropriate standards of what is possible?”
7.
When explaining the “informal” terminology Blair (2015: 28) makes an 
interesting analogy:
You need to be wary of the notion that in the term “informal logic,” the 
word ‘informal’ means “informal” and the word ‘logic’ means “logic.” It is like 
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the use of the term ‘football’ north of Mexico. In the USA and in Canada, 
the games called “football” don’t much call for the players to control a ball 
with their feet. Informal logicians use variables, and talk about argument 
schemes, which are quasi formal. So informal logic is not strictly-speaking 
informal. And if you understand by logic the study of axiomatized deductive 
systems, informal logic is not logic.
Let me further develop this analogy. According to Wikipedia “Football 
is a family of team sports that involve, to varying degrees, kicking a 
ball with the foot to score a goal. Unqualifi ed, the word football is un-
derstood to refer to whichever form of football is the most popular in 
the regional context in which the word appears.”3 And even more for-
mal Encyclopædia Britannica characterizes football as “any of a num-
ber of related games, all of which are characterized by two persons 
or teams attempting to kick, carry, throw, or otherwise propel a ball 
toward an opponent’s goal. In some of these games, only kicking is al-
lowed; in others, kicking has become less important than other means 
of propulsion.”4 In the same spirit we could ask: are the boundaries of 
logic really determined by the rules of formalization, axiomatic systems 
and classical deduction? Theory of proofs, theory of models, recursive 
functions ..., belong to a certain “regional” variety of logic. But logic in a 
broad sense (patterns of reasoning which by a certain type of necessity 
preserve acceptability) can be played differently. True, the rules are 
not strict, but we play that game everywhere and every day.
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